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Denver University Law Review's 75th Anniversary
LAW REvIEwS AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP:
SOME COMMENTS
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN"
Law reviews are the primary outlet for legal scholars, and the law
review system is unique to legal education. People in other fields are
astonished when they learn about it; they can hardly believe their ears.
What, students decide which articles are worthy to be published? No peer
review? And the students chop the work of their professors to bits?
Amazing. And then they check every single footnote against the original
source? Completely loco. Can this really be the way it is?
Secretly, I share their astonishment; and I think the system is every
bit as crazy, in some ways, as they think it is. There is, in fact, quite a
literature of invective-professors and others railing against the law re-
views.' But it would be rude to make much of a point of all this. After
all, the reason I am writing these lines is because the University of Den-
ver asked me to contribute a few pages in honor of their law review and
its anniversary. A guest is not supposed to question the very existence of
his host. Besides, Denver is one of the few-the very few-schools that
takes law-and-society seriously, and its ethos and point of view no doubt
have an impact on its law review as well.
So, instead of carping and whining, I want to explore a few features
of the law review system, and speculate about their consequences. After
all, an institution so entrenched is bound to affect the very nature of legal
scholarship-both in formal senses (for example, the length of articles);
and in the substantive sense (what people write about). The medium may
* Marion Rice Kirkwood Professor, Stanford Law School. J.D., 1951; M.LL., 1953,
University of Chicago.
1. See, e.g., Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and
Tenure, 103 HARv. L. REv. 926 (1990); James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
527 (1994); James Lindgren, Reforming the American Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1123 (1995);
Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Stident-Edited Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1131 (1995).
The literature goes back quite far--at least as far as the well-known article by Fred Rodell, Goodbye
to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REv. 38 (1937).
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not be the message, but it bends and refracts the kind of messages that
people are likely to send.
If you wanted to defend the system, you might begin by pointing out
that law reviews were not designed, originally, to serve as the primary
vehicle for legal scholarship. They were supposed to be training for stu-
dents. Students learn how to be careful and precise, how to edit, how to
handle (legal) language, and how to construct and critique (legal) argu-
ments. At the same time, the law review students form a kind of elite. In
the old days, their elite status was even more pronounced than it is now.
The best employers, hoping to skim off the cream, would hire only law
review editors. Law review was therefore an adjunct to the grading sys-
tem. For students, it could be an important rung on the ladder of success.
The students, of course, were producing work that was (or was supposed
to be) scholarly. Nonetheless, the prime goal of the review, originally,
was not scholarship as such, but getting training and practice for stu-
dents.
The law review, however, also became a prestige item for the
school, and in the course of time every school decided they had to have
one. The Harvard Law Review dates from the late 19th century. In 1900
only a handful of law schools had law reviews. Now they all do-well,
almost all. Many schools have two. A few have as many as five or six.
Harvard apparently has nine (or is it ten?). Berkeley has given birth to
eight; Tulane has six reviews, Notre Dame five, Temple four.' In almost
all schools, though, there is the law review; and the second or third jour-
nals are, well, second- or third-class citizens.
The net result, of course, is that there is a staggering number of law
reviews and subsidiary law reviews. According to one study, there were
326 of them in 1985.' There are now apparently over 400. This is another
unique aspect of the system: no other field has so many journals. There
are a lot more academic psychologists and economists than there are law
professors; but many fewer journals. Economists talk about the "big
five;" there are of course many journals for economists, not just five; but
most of the others fall far short by way of prestige. In law, there are doz-
ens and dozens of respectable, even prestigious law reviews. Not only
are there many, but the law reviews are getting fatter and fatter all the
time. Some of them publish eight issues or more a year. The Denver
University Law Review runs over 1,000 pages a year. That is nothing
special. Some journals, to be sure, publish fewer pages, but lots of them
publish more. The Harvard Law Review (Vol. 1 had a mere 408 pages)
2. Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace,
71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 615,638-39.
3. Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal
Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK
U. L. REv. 353, 363 (1996).
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runs to more than 2,000 pages. It is not alone. Vol. 95 of the Michigan
Law Review, for 1997, ran to 2,658 pages; and Vol. 70 of the Tulane Law
Review attained 2,749 pages. Can anybody read that much?
With all those pages at their disposal--one estimate is that there are
over 150,000 printed pages available annually, 150,000 hungry mouths
to feed 4 -the reviews can afford to print really long articles. No econo-
mist or psychologist could hope to place an article of 100 pages, or even
70 pages, in any leading journal. But very long articles are common in
law reviews--they are even completely normal. In 1985, the mean length
of law review articles, in a sample of reviews, was 41.83 pages.5 Fifty
pages is therefore nothing special. Seventy makes hardly a ripple. Ninety
and 100 page articles are easy to find. In Vol. 82 of the Virginia Law
Review, I came across an article that was 229 pages long, with 769 foot-
notes. Is this some sort of record? Not at all. One notable article, pub-
lished in 1987, was 491 pages long, swallowed up two whole issues of a
review, and contained 4,824 footnotes.
Law review editors are supposed to enforce tight, concise writing.
But in fact, legal scholarship suffers enormously from bloat. Very few
articles are tightly written. They might have tight sentences, but the piece
itself goes on and on. And on. Many articles have a kind of hopeless obe-
sity. They display absolutely everything the author has read on the sub-
ject, or related subjects, or subjects related to related subjects. The foot-
notes often almost crowd out the text. If there were only a handful of
journals, the typical article would have to be lean and spare. The authors
would be forced to get to the point immediately. As it is, if somebody
writes (say) an article on some small point of divorce or tax law or the
constitution, the author is likely to begin with 30 pages or more of intro-
ductory material. She will put the subject in context, discuss it histoii-
cally, mention (and perhaps critique) everything else written about it;
most of this stuff is wholly unnecessary to the modest point that comes
up after the reader (if there is one) wades through oceans of print. I say
30 pages; but I have seen articles with way, way more-huge, inflated
articles whose "introductions" were as long as the rest of the article; and
completely unnecessary.7
The law reviews have such a voracious appetite for material, that
anything can get published; and by that I mean anything. Published, that
is, somewhere. Yet, somewhat paradoxically, the competition to get into
the "better" law reviews is fierce and unremitting. A high-prestige law
4. Michael L. Closen & Robert J. Dzielak, The History and Influence of the Law Review
Institution, 30 AKRON L. REV. 15, 38 (1996).
5. Saks et al., supra note 3, at 366.
6. The article, mentioned in Lasson, supra note 1, at 937, is Arnold S. Jacobs, An Analysis of
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 207 (1987).
7. For a defense of this practice, see Wendy J. Gordon, Counter-Manifesto: Student-Edited
Reviews and the Intellectual Properties of Scholarship, 61 U. CI. L. REv. 541, 547-48 (1994).
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review will receive hundreds of manuscripts a year; and accept maybe
1% of these. According to one estimate, the top journals get as many as
1,200 annual submissions. This tremendous load is exaggerated by the
custom of multiple submissions. Our author will print out fifty copies of
her masterpiece, and send it off to fifty law reviews. If they all reject (or,
more likely, ignore) her, she will crank up the Xerox machine and send it
out to fifty more. You can't do that in journals that operate on the peer
review system. But on law reviews, manuscripts are read not by faculty
but by students, and nobody cares about wasting their time.
Thus the system of law reviews affects what appears in them in
some important structural ways. It encourages long, wordy articles
crammed with footnotes. (This custom is reinforced by, or reinforces, the
notion that young professors must write at least one long, complex,
densely annotated "tenure piece," and place it in a leading review.) The
footnotes, of course, get meticulously checked by the student editors and
editors-to-be. This relieves the author of some of the responsibility for
accuracy. Why bother, when the law review is going to check the foot-
notes, anyway? The law reviews also enforced a certain style of writing;
and they forced footnotes and sources into a rigid "blue book" strait-
jacket. The official law review style was dull and flat. All the blood was
drained out of it. Law review editors hated short, simple sentences. They
loved to string clauses together with words like "whereas" or "albeit."
They loved to say things like "assuming, arguendo, that . . ." They
committed many crimes against our mother tongue. To be fair, the
straitjacket has gotten a shade looser lately; first of all, the law reviews
have opened their doors to "narrative," and, whatever the failings of this
style, it is not usually boring. I also have the impression that at least some
authors of standard articles have learned to write decent English. But on
the whole, law review style-blight is still definitely there.
What about content? The influence of the law review system on the
nature of legal scholarship is much harder to show than the influence on
matters of structure, style, and form. But so pervasive a system is bound
to have some sort of impact, if we could only figure out what it is. One
thing is clear- the law reviews definitely have power-at least within the
academy. 9 If the editors of the Harvard Law Review accept an article by
young Smithers, a brand-new assistant professor at the University of
North Dakota Law School, they have definitely given his career a jump-
start. Poor Smithers-if he only knew what sorts of thing those editors
really dug!
8. Hibbitts, supra note 2, at 643. -
9. Do they influence the law itself? The work of judges? What legislators think? This is a
different and very difficult question. There may be some slight impact, but it is certainly hard to
show.
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The editors would no doubt say, if asked, that what they like is
quality; but that is only partly true. They like quality, but they also like
articles that are relevant, trendy, with-it (whether they realize this fact or
not). Who sets the trends? It is, probably, a kind of reciprocal affair: the
law reviews print what appeals to the student editors, but what appeals to
the student editors is, in part at least, the result of what their professors
tell them is "in," or what excites the professors and gets radiated through
the classroom experience.
In any event, no matter how much some professors carp at them, the
reviews are here to stay. They cannot be replaced by peer-review jour-
nals: out of the question. Where would we find so many peers? There
are, in fact, a fair number of law-related journals that are peer-review
journals-the Law & Society Review, for example, or the Journal of Law
& Economics. There are likely to be more in the future. But I do not ex-
pect these journals to drive the law reviews out of business. Peer review,
anyway, is far from perfect. Professors are not angels, and they are not
unbiased. Most of them are former law review editors, after all. They can
be just as trendy as their students.' °
Ultimately, then, the problem is not really the law reviews: the
problem is legal scholarship itself-the subject matter that fills the law
reviews." I now turn briefly to this subject.
At the beginning of the century, legal scholarship fell for the most
part into three categories. There was doctrinal analysis-attempts to line
up cases, to put them into some kind of order, to explain how they related
to each other. There were critiques: the raw material was the same sort of
doctrinal analysis, but the writer criticized some cases, and praised cer-
tain other cases. On what basis did he do this? Legal logic, of the Lang-
dell sort; or some sort of vague appeal to social norms-statements that
such and such was the "better" rule, or the "more just" rule. The third
category consisted of casebooks and other teaching materials. These. do
not particularly relate to the law review, so I will pass this category by.
The aims of legal scholarship have changed over the years. Langdell
thought law was a "science." The job of the law teacher was to teach
students the principles of that science. Langdell himself put together a
casebook, but wrote almost nothing else. His followers were also case-
book editors; and they critiqued cases from the standpoint of what they
considered logic and legal principle. There was also a generation of great
treatise-writers-men like Williston, Corbin, and Wigmore. They
10. Hibbitts, supra note 2, at 653.
11. Much of the following is impressionistic. I am not aware of any actual study of the content
of law reviews in the 1990s. For an earlier study, see Lowell J. Noteboom & Timothy B. Walker,
Survey, The Law Review-Is It Meeting the Needs of the Legal Community?, 44 DENV. U. 426
(1967).
12. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1983).
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amassed enormous textbooks-works in many volumes, which were
supposed to be definitive and exhaustive statements of the law on some
subject. There were great differences between, say, Williston (very
Langdellian), and Corbin (more of a realist); but they were writing in the
same genre nonetheless. These men became leading "authorities" in their
fields, and were at the pinnacle of the teaching profession. They were
concerned exclusively with appellate case law, with putting it into some
kind of order, and separating wheat from chaff.
Legal scholarship today is different, much more complex, and in
many ways totally anarchic. The older forms of scholarship no longer
command the same respect (the casebook might be a partial exception).
Doctrinal analysis is still "the staple commodity, even in the reviews
edited at fancy schools,"'3 but it definitely has rivals which vie for atten-
tion at these "fancy schools" and at others as well. Faculty members have
gone off in a dozen directions at once-law and economics, law and so-
ciety, critical approaches, feminist approaches, approaches out of history,
philosophy, psychology, even literary studies. It would be rash to say that
there is no hierarchy any longer. Constitutional theory still seems to be
king of the jungle. But the lines are most definitely blurred.
Much legal writing, however, is still quite normative. 14 It still asks
the question, what is the right rule, the good rule, or the right or good
institution? And the most popular currents in legal scholarship all try to
answer this question, in one way or another. The different strands of
scholarship simply use different techniques and criteria. Many legal
economists, for example, have done nothing more than to take the old
questions, only giving them new answers. What is the more efficient rule
or institution? They apply their techniques to doctrine in torts, property
law, contracts, bankruptcy, and so on. That the critical literature is, well,
critical, goes without saying. It too is concerned with what is right and
what is wrong. The critical writers do not always know what the right
arrangement is, but they are certainly keen on spotting and unmasking
the wrong ones. The leading specialists in constitutional law-the theo-
rists--also write in a heavily normative way. They try to construct a
13. Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the 'Middle Ground,' 91 MIcH. L. REv. 2075,
2100 (1993). Gordon's article is part of a symposium of comments on Harry T. Edward, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34
(1992), an article which, among other things, attacked the law schools (and law reviews) for turning
away from scholarship that was useful to the profession. Among the many interesting comments, see
Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1921 (1993).
14. Edward L. Rubin, indeed, claims that the
entire point of standard legal scholarship is to explore and contrast the pragmatic
implications of conflicting normative positions . .. . The most promising discourse for
standard legal scholarship... is not the vaguely articulated neo-formalism of the courts,
but prescriptive arguments based on consciously acknowledged normative positions.
Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1835, 1893
(1988).
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system of postulates or guidelines which would let us know which cases
the Supreme Court decided correctly; and which it did not.
I do not want to exaggerate. Nor do I want to say that these currents
of scholarship have no value. They most certainly do-some more than
others, of course. And the recent "schools" of thought cannot and should
not be treated as if they were monoliths. Terms like "feminist jurispru-
dence" are pretty big tents; they cover a wide area, and all sorts of differ-
ent tendencies and points of view huddle under them.
Still, those of us (like myself) who consider ourselves members of
the law and society movement are apt to deplore the strong and almost
exclusively normative flavor of legal scholarship. Perhaps it would be
better to say we are disappointed with how little influence we have in the
legal academy; how sad we are that the parade seems to be passing us
by.15
Normativity in legal scholarship means that most of the social sci-
ences get short-changed. The exception is economics; but even here, the
"economics" of law and economics tends not to be, with honorable ex-
ceptions, data-driven, empirical economics; it is pretty theoretical, and
pretty normative, as I have already mentioned. Legal history is in some-
what better shape. It has a growing literature; and it is genuinely popular
with students, at many law schools. And many, many of these schools in
fact offer course-work in legal history. Very few schools, on the other
hand, offer courses in law and society.
My impression is that, nonetheless, far too many law professors
really have no idea what legal history is all about; and the same goes for
work in the law and society tradition. This kind of scholarship is quite
foreign to them. My evidence is mostly anecdotal, I have to admit. But it
is based on my own experience; and the experience of colleagues. I hear,
over and over again, colleagues dismissing work in history and empirical
social science as "merely descriptive." They say that the work lacks
"theory." I have heard this, for example, in conversations with professors
who ask me my opinion of some young law teacher, struggling to get
tenure. Yes, they say, this is an extensive piece of work; but isn't it
"merely descriptive?" I never hear "descriptive" without the word
"merely" attached. And "descriptive" is obviously something bad in it-
self. Other young scholars have told me that they are expected to forget
the "law and" stuff; if they want tenure, they have to write a major "le-
gal" piece, and get placed in one of the better law reviews. I know of one
case where a promising junior scholar put aside his massive, significant
historical study for years, while he ground out "law review articles" to
qualify for tenure. Maybe he was overreacting to a chance comment here
and there. Maybe he misread the situation. But even this is significant. I
15. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REv. 763 (1986).
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am sure these young scholars cannot be totally wrong, and totally para-
noid.
In legal scholarship, "theory" is king. But people who talk about le-
gal "theory" have a strange idea of what "theory" means. In most fields,
a theory has to be testable; it is a hypothesis, a prediction, and therefore
subject to proof. When legal scholars use the word "theory," they seem
to mean (most of the time) something they consider deep, original, and
completely untestable. History almost by definition lacks theory. Empiri-
cal studies, too, are not theoretical-they are, of course, "merely de-
scriptive."
So the caravan moves on without us. I don't want to be too pessi-
mistic, however. Somehow, and in the face of obstacles, the law and so-
ciety movement does lurch forward. It does better outside the law
schools than inside. Legal history has done well inside law schools. Both
of these fields do not have to rely on law reviews; they have their own
journals-peer review journals at that. The law reviews, however, are
dominated by the powerful, normative schools of thought that struggle
with each other, debate each other, and fill up thousands of pages every
year. For most legal scholars, the law reviews are legal scholarship; and
nothing else (except case-books) is worth considering as such.16
Will the situation change? The law review system is here to stay, as
far as I can tell. What the reviews print is another story. They will con-
tinue to mirror what happens in the law schools. It is very unlikely that
the law school world will kick its habit of normativity; almost impossible
for what I consider real scholarship to become the dominant form in law
schools. Perhaps there is no real alternative. Still, a few more recruits
would be welcome in the club.
In general, law schools all sing the same song, and pursue the same
goals. There are some honorable exceptions. Wisconsin, Denver, and
Berkeley are schools that take seriously the job of relating law to the
society in which it is imbedded. Scholarship that looks with a keen, rig-
orous eye at legal process; scholarship that is not afraid of exploring re-
ality; scholarship that straddles disciplines, and draws inspiration from
the social sciences--this kind of scholarship is nurtured at these few
schools, and sporadically at others. The work that scholars do at these
schools spills over into the law reviews, of course. This work is like rain
in the desert. Like rain in the desert, however, it is all too rare.
16. Hence when the Chicago-Kent Law Review did a survey of "faculty scholarship," they
limited the survey to articles published in the top twenty journals. They did not count the peer review
journals; and they did not count books, book chapters, and so on. Janet M. Gumn, Chicago-Kent
Law Review Faculty Scholarship Survey, 66 Cn.-KENT L. REv. 509 (1990). The survey covered the
period 1983-1988. Almost everything I wrote in that period (for example), would not have been
counted.
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